docs: audit links, glossary T0-T4, readability pass
CI & Release / Verify simulator (push) Skipped
CI & Release / Trivy scan (push) Skipped
CI & Release / Semantic Release (push) Skipped
CI & Release / Verify simulator (pull_request) Failing after 4s
CI & Release / Trivy scan (pull_request) Skipped
CI & Release / Semantic Release (pull_request) Skipped

Extend glossary with storage floors, source of truth, and linkable anchors.
Fix broken links, pose frame drift, rsync/offload wording, and README tone.
Add docs/improvement audit records and live demo links in design journey.
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-10 10:46:59 +01:00
parent ed531f9fb6
commit 5f6fd8462c
27 changed files with 376 additions and 193 deletions
+13 -11
View File
@@ -16,19 +16,21 @@ Bandwidth is the scarcest resource in the system. Every message class gets an ex
## Broadcast payload: small on the wire, precise at rest
The `state` broadcast is a fixed compact frame:
The `state` broadcast is a fixed compact frame (46 bytes, little-endian):
| Field | Type | Notes |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `drone_id` | uint16 | Fleet-scoped registry |
| `magic` | 2 bytes | `b"SH"` |
| `version` | uint8 | Protocol version |
| `drone_id` | 8 bytes | Zero-padded ASCII fleet id |
| `ts_ns` | int64 | Epoch nanoseconds, same clock domain as storage |
| `pos_x/y/z` | int32 | **Millimeters** in the mission frame — quantized only here, storage keeps full float precision |
| `att_roll/pitch/yaw` | int16 | Centi-degrees |
| `vel_x/y/z` | int16 | cm/s |
| `frame_ref` | uint8 | Frame of reference id (GPS-denied: local/visual-odometry frames must be explicit) |
| `frame_ref` | uint8 | Frame of reference id ([GPS-denied](00-glossary.md#swarm--robotics): local/visual-odometry frames must be explicit) |
| `flags` | uint8 | Battery-low, returning, degraded-sensors, … |
~40 bytes per frame → a 50-drone swarm at 5 Hz is ~10 KB/s of pose traffic before transport overhead. Trivial even on a congested mesh.
46 bytes per frame → a 50-drone swarm at 5 Hz is ~11.5 KB/s of pose traffic before transport overhead. Trivial even on a congested mesh.
`detections` events are slightly larger (class, confidence, bounding volume, ego-pose) but event-shaped and rare by comparison.
@@ -51,7 +53,7 @@ graph LR
SB -->|"store-and-forward relay"| SC
```
### Recommended: Zenoh
### Recommended: [Zenoh](00-glossary.md#swarm--robotics)
- Designed exactly for constrained, dynamic networks: built-in peer discovery, brokerless peer-to-peer mode, store-and-forward, and a query layer on top of pub/sub.
- First-class robotics citizenship: an official ROS 2 RMW implementation exists, so the ingestion side and the sync side can share one middleware.
@@ -68,13 +70,13 @@ graph LR
## Two sync mechanisms, deliberately separate
1. **Fast path — pub/sub (Zenoh):** pose frames and detection events. Fire-and-forget with bounded staleness; consumers keep a peer-state cache.
2. **Bulk path — rsync over persistent SSH:** sealed `detections`/`state` Parquet partitions are pulled opportunistically between drones when links allow. This is how a drone that was out of range catches up on mission history without anyone re-sending events.
1. **Fast path — pub/sub ([Zenoh](00-glossary.md#swarm--robotics)):** pose frames and detection events. Fire-and-forget with bounded staleness; consumers keep a peer-state cache.
2. **Bulk path — [rsync](00-glossary.md#bulk-sync) over persistent SSH:** sealed `detections`/`state` Parquet partitions are pulled opportunistically between drones when links allow. This is how a drone that was out of range catches up on mission history without anyone re-sending events.
Why SSH-based bulk sync over object-store replication:
- **Identity is already there.** Every drone holds pre-provisioned ed25519 keys and a fixed `known_hosts`/`authorized_keys` set from ground provisioning ([05](05-network-security.md)) — the trust model needs no new machinery.
- **One persistent multiplexed session** (`ControlMaster`) per peer costs almost nothing at idle and survives as a single TCP stream; every transfer rides it without new handshakes.
- **Identity is already there.** Every drone holds pre-provisioned [ed25519](00-glossary.md#infrastructure--delivery) keys and a fixed `known_hosts`/`authorized_keys` set from ground provisioning ([05](05-network-security.md)) — the trust model needs no new machinery.
- **One persistent multiplexed session** ([`ControlMaster`](00-glossary.md#infrastructure--delivery)) per peer costs almost nothing at idle and survives as a single TCP stream; every transfer rides it without new handshakes.
- **rsync delta transfer is resumable** across link drops — exactly the failure mode of an ad-hoc mesh — and the shared partition layout makes it trivially incremental: same paths, same files, pull only what is missing.
- **Zero extra services** on the flight-critical node. MinIO remains available where an S3 API is genuinely wanted (ground warehouse, and optionally on board), but the in-flight bulk path does not depend on it.
@@ -83,7 +85,7 @@ Partition healing is automatic: replication is pull-based, addressed by partitio
Two deliberate non-features of the SSH channel:
- **No remote filesystem mounts in flight.** FUSE/sshfs over a lossy mesh inherits NFS hang semantics — processes block uninterruptibly when the link drops. Mounts are fine on the bench and at the dock; in flight, data moves by pull, never by mount.
- **No free-form remote execution.** Arbitrary drone-to-drone exec would mean one compromised unit owns the fleet. Instead, every permitted operation is an **SSH forced command** (`command="…"` in `authorized_keys`, one key pair per operation): the key *is* the API. Flexible like a CLI, auditable like an RPC, least-privilege by construction.
- **No free-form remote execution.** Arbitrary drone-to-drone exec would mean one compromised unit owns the fleet. Instead, every permitted operation is an **SSH [forced command](00-glossary.md#infrastructure--delivery)** (`command="…"` in `authorized_keys`, one key pair per operation): the key *is* the API. Flexible like a CLI, auditable like an RPC, least-privilege by construction.
## Design decision: SQL-over-SSH as the peer query channel
@@ -114,7 +116,7 @@ SQL access must not become a write channel. A single "read-only connection" flag
- **Schema-first:** all datasets share the versioned schemas from [03](03-data-platform.md); a query addresses `dataset + partition predicates + column projection + time range`. Schema version is negotiated from the fleet release manifest — peers on one release speak one schema by construction.
- **Read-only SELECT over the local Parquet store**, streamed back as Parquet/Arrow batches over the multiplexed SSH session. Never JSON blobs.
- **On the ground — GraphQL as the integration standard:** the warehouse exposes the same schemas through GraphQL for the multi-team surface, where flexibility and introspection matter more than grams and milliwatts. **Arrow Flight** is the upgrade path for heavy columnar serving from T3 if result sizes outgrow it.
- **On the ground — GraphQL as the integration standard:** the warehouse exposes the same schemas through GraphQL for the multi-team surface, where flexibility and introspection matter more than grams and milliwatts. **Arrow Flight** is the upgrade path for heavy columnar serving from [T3](00-glossary.md#t3--warehouse) if result sizes outgrow it.
What this buys operationally: the dev/bench experience and the flight protocol are the same thing. An engineer debugging on the bench runs the identical query a peer drone would run — same wrapper, same permissions, same output format. There is no "debug API" that behaves differently from the real one.