docs: WireGuard vs SSH, Flux GitOps, CONTRIBUTING with TDD-first

Document why WireGuard and SSH are complementary layers, add Flux
boundaries for the ground segment, shared var/ data paths in docs/06,
and a contributor guide with the required test-first workflow.
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- **RSSI is data.** Per-peer signal strength is captured into `telemetry` like any other sensor — it feeds relative-positioning estimates and post-flight link-quality analysis, and it is free.
- Electromagnetic environment sensing (whatever the radio can observe) is likewise recorded — cheap in flight, valuable in replay.
## Why not SSH alone?
SSH and WireGuard solve different problems. SSH is the **authorization layer** for narrow, point-to-point operations (bulk sync, read-only SQL). WireGuard is the **membership and transport encryption layer** for everything on the mesh, including traffic SSH cannot carry.
| Concern | SSH alone | WireGuard + SSH (this design) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Pose broadcast (UDP, ~5 Hz, compact frame) | Cannot carry subnet broadcast; would need a separate app protocol | Encrypted inside the mesh overlay; any peer on the tunnel can receive |
| Broadcast confidentiality without WG | Payloads traverse the radio **in cleartext** — any receiver in range reads swarm positions | Only provisioned fleet members complete a handshake; outsiders see noise |
| Lossy ad-hoc links | TCP head-of-line blocking; sessions stall and reconnect on packet loss | UDP transport survives loss and roaming; SSH sessions **over** WG are more stable than SSH directly on Wi-Fi |
| Network membership | Any host that reaches the port gets an SSH banner — a probe surface | Devices without a provisioned key get **no handshake response**; the port is effectively silent |
**Rejected alternative:** encrypt each broadcast frame in application code with a fleet-wide AEAD key. That reinvents a crypto layer the OS already provides, still leaves TCP head-of-line blocking for peer queries, and does not answer the membership question (who is allowed on the mesh at all).
Keep both layers: WireGuard for *who is on the network and whether the wire is readable*; SSH forced commands for *what a peer is allowed to do once connected* ([04](04-swarm-sync.md)).
## Key lifecycle
| Phase | Action |